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Wireless sensor networks are comprised of a vast number of ultra-small autonomous computing, communi-
cation and sensing devices, with restricted energy and computing capabilities, that co-operate to accomplish
a large sensing task. Such networks can be very useful in practice, e.g. in the local monitoring of ambient
conditions and reporting them to a control center. In this paper we propose a new lightweight, distributed
group key establishment protocol suitable for such energy constrained networks. Our approach basically
trade-oﬀs complex message exchanges by performing some amount of additional local computations. The ex-
tra computations are simple for the devices to implement and are evenly distributed across the participants
of the network leading to good energy balance. We evaluate the performance our protocol in comparison to
existing group key establishment protocols both in simulated and real environments. The intractability of
all protocols is based on the Diﬃe-Hellman problem and we used its elliptic curve analog in our experiments.
Our ﬁndings basically indicate the feasibility of implementing our protocol in real sensor network devices
and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each approach given the available technology and the
corresponding eﬃciency (energy, time) criteria.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks are considered as very large systems comprised of small
sized, low-power, low-cost sensor devices that collect detailed information about
the physical environment. Each device has one or more sensors (e.g. light, heat,
movement, chemical presence, etc.), embedded processors and low-power radios,
and is normally battery operated. Examining each such single device individually,
might appear to have small utility. The realization of Sensor networks however,
lies in using and co-coordinating a vast number of such devices and allows the
implementation of very large sensing tasks. The system is deployed in areas of
interest (ranging from homes to inaccessible terrains, disaster places, etc.) making
them smart spaces where ﬁne grained monitoring services and applications can be
provided [1].
The unique characteristics of this regime give rise to very diﬀerent design trade-
oﬀs than current general-purpose systems. The realization of such eﬃcient, robust
and secure ad-hoc networking environments is a challenging algorithmic, systems
and technological task. Large numbers of such tiny and resource-constrained de-
vices should self-organize into an ad-hoc network under highly dynamic ambient
conditions, carrying out computations locally and engaging into a collaborative
computing and communication eﬀort. The required solutions diﬀer signiﬁcantly,
not only with respect to classic distributed computing but also with respect to
ad-hoc networking. To further emphasize on the diﬀerence consider that in sensor
networks (i) the number of interacting devices is extremely large and dense com-
pared to that in a typical ad-hoc network, (ii) the resources of each node are very
limited, (iii) there is no ﬁxed infrastructure, (iv) the network topology is unknown
before deployment and (v) there is a high risk of physical attacks in unprotected
sensor nodes.
Such systems should at least guarantee the conﬁdentiality and integrity of the
information reported to the controlling authorities regarding the realization of envi-
ronmental events. Therefore, key distribution is critical for the protection in wireless
sensor networks and the prevention of adversaries from attacking the network. How-
ever, key management and establishment can be a diﬃcult task in such networks
and may waste the limited energy resources of the devices. The constraints of sensor
node hardware inﬂuence the type of security mechanisms and protocols that can
be hosted on a sensor node platform. Moreover, the ad hoc networking topology
makes it susceptible to link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active
interference. Therefore, the choice of a key establishment protocol for the creation
of a shared, secret key must be done very carefully and should exhibit the following
critical properties: (i) availability, in the sense that any sensor node or service of the
whole wireless network must be available whenever required, (ii) key authentication,
assuring only intended nodes can access a key, (iii) integrity, ensuring that there
is no unauthorized data modiﬁcation and (iv) conﬁdentiality, by providing security
measures in order to avoid eavesdropping. Furthermore, some additional require-
ments are needed for the evaluation of key distribution in wireless sensor networks:
(a) scalability, in the sense that they should operate eﬃciently in extremely large
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networks composed of huge numbers of nodes, (b) eﬃciency with respect to both
energy and time and (c) fault-tolerance as sensor devices are prone to several types
of faults and unavailabilities, and may become inoperative (permanently or tem-
porarily). In this sense, group key establishment is potentially more suitable than
pairwise key establishment as sensors do not waste energy every time they wish to
communicate with another device by establishing a new shared secret key.
Group key management mainly includes activities for the establishment and
the maintenance of a group key. Secure group communication requires scalable and
eﬃcient group membership with appropriate access control measures to protect data
and to cope with potential compromises. A secret key for data encryption must be
distributed with a secure and eﬃcient way to all members of the group. Another
important requirement of group key management protocols is key freshness. A key
is fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new. Moreover, the shared group key must be
known only to the members of the group. Four important cryptographic properties
must be encountered in group key agreement [20,22]. Assume that a group key is
changed m times and the sequence of successive keys is K={K0, . . . ,Km}.
(i) Computational group key secrecy: It guarantees that it is computational
infeasible for any passive adversary to discover any group key Ki ∈ K for all i.
(ii) Decisional group key secrecy: It ensures that there is no information leak-
age other that public blinded key information.
(iii) Key independence: It guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a
proper subset of group keys can not discover any other of the remaining keys.
Key independence can be decomposed into forward secrecy and backward
secrecy. Forward secrecy guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a
contiguous subset of old group keys cannot discover any subsequent group key.
Backward secrecy guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a contiguous
subset of group keys cannot discover preceding group key.
Group key establishment can be either centralized or distributed. In the ﬁrst
case, a member of the group is responsible for the generation and the distribution
of the key. In distributed group key establishment all group members contribute to
the generation of the key. Clearly, the second approach is suited for sensor networks
because problems with centralized trust and the existence of single point of failure
can be avoided. In our paper, we consider distributed group key establishment
protocols [5,10,14,28] which can be applied in dynamic groups (where members can
be excluded or added) and provide forward and backward secrecy. Moreover, all
these protocols are based on the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange algorithm [13] and
constitute natural extensions of it in the multiparty case.
Related Work and Comparison. Most group key establishment protocols are
based on generalizations of Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocol [13]. The ﬁrst
attempt for the construction of such protocols was made by Ingemarsson, Tang and
Wong [14] that arrange the participants in a logical ring via a synchronous start
up phase. The protocol completes in n − 1 rounds, where n is the number of the
participants.
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Burmester and Desmedt presented in [10] a more eﬃcient scheme which requires
only three rounds. However, the protocol’s disadvantage is that (i) every participant
must perform n+1 exponentiations and (ii) communication is based on concurrent
broadcasts that lead to high number of collisions, a situation very common in wire-
less sensor networks that aﬀects performance [12]. Moreover, the authors do not
provide a proof of security (in the stronger sense of semantic security). Recently,
Katz and Yung [19] proposed a more general framework that provides a formal
proof of security for this protocol. In Hypercube protocol [5] the participants in the
network are arranged in a logical hypercube. This topology decreases the number
of transmitted data and exponentiation operations, but still the protocol is very
demanding for use in sensor networks.
One of the most eﬃcient protocols in the literature for group key management
is the third protocol GDH.3 of Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner presented in [28]. This
protocol requires serial execution of computations that makes it ineﬃcient for highly
dynamic networks with large number of nodes. More precisely, this protocol may
not be a good choice for an dynamically evolving ad hoc environment since the last
node in the protocols computation would have to know the whole structure of the
network.
A performance analysis of all the above mentioned protocols is presented in [3,2]
which clearly shows the superiority of GDH.3 protocol in the number of transmit-
ted data and exponentiation operations required. They show that the number of
messages and exponentiations is linear to the number of the participants, while for
all other protocols are of order n logn or n2.
A very eﬃcient protocol is also presented in [20]. In this recent work, a logical
key tree structure is used to improve the scalability of the key agreement protocol.
Any device can calculate the group key if it knows all the keys in its co path. This
requirement makes the protocol quite expensive in storage memory that is critical
for sensor networks. For these reasons, we believe that the simplicity and the limited
memory requirements of GDH.3 protocol make it more suitable and applicable in
sensor networks. Finally, we note that the recent papers of Bresson et al. [7,8,9]
were the ﬁrst to present a formal model of security for group authenticated key
exchange and the ﬁrst to give rigorous proofs of security for particular protocols.
Main Findings. In this work, we propose a new distributed group key manage-
ment protocol suitable for such energy constrained networks. This protocol resem-
bles GDH.3 in its ﬁrst stage but instead of requiring direct communication among
the participants of the network, it relies on short-range hop-by-hop propagation.
To do this we employ a larger number of public key encryption and decryption
operations per sensor node. The extra computations are simple for the devices to
implement and are evenly distributed across the participants of the network, leading
to fewer number of message exchanges. Our group key management protocol han-
dles membership events like join or leave in order to provide forward and backward
secrecy.
We implementated our protocol using the elliptic curve version of Diﬃe-Hellman
problem [13]. This allows us to use much smaller keys than conventional, discrete
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logarithm based cryptosystems (an 160-bit key in an elliptic curve cryptosystem
provides equivalent security with a 1024-bit key in a conventional cryptosystem).
This fact makes elliptic curves the only reasonable choice for sensor networks, where
the resources are very limited. Moreover, recent research has shown that public
key cryptography based on elliptic curves is feasible to be used in sensor networks
[16,17,23].
We conducted a comparative performance evaluation of our protocol with the
GDH.3 protocol [28] for various network topologies using both experiments and
simulation. The experimental study demonstrates the feasibility of implementing
our protocol in real sensor network devices while the simulation study highlights the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach given the available technology and
the corresponding eﬃciency (energy, time) criteria. Overall our protocol manages to
evenly distribute the energy dissipation among the sensor devices, leading to better
energy balance.
2 Preliminaries of Elliptic Curve Theory
In this section we review some basic concepts regarding elliptic curves and their
deﬁnition over ﬁnite ﬁelds. The interested reader may ﬁnd additional information
in e.g. [6,26]. We also assume familiarity with elementary number theory (see e.g.,
[11]). The elliptic curves are usually deﬁned over binary ﬁelds F2m (m ≥ 1), or over
prime ﬁelds Fp, p > 3. In our experimental results we used elliptic curves deﬁned
over prime ﬁelds.
An elliptic curve E(Fp) over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp, where p > 3 and prime, is the set
of points (x, y) ∈ Fp (represented by aﬃne coordinates) which satisfy the equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b(1)
and a, b ∈ Fp are such that 4a3 + 27b2 = 0. The set of solutions (x, y) of Eq. (1)
together with a point O, called the point at inﬁnity, and a special addition operation
deﬁne an Abelian group, called the Elliptic Curve group. The point O acts as the
identity element (for deﬁnition of addition see [6,26]).
The order m of an elliptic curve is the number of the points in E(Fp). The
order of a point P is the smallest positive integer n for which nP = O. Application
of Langrange’s theorem (see e.g. [11]) on E(Fp), gives that the order of a point
P ∈ E(Fp) always divides the order of the elliptic curve group, so mP = O for any
point P ∈ E(Fp), which implies that the order of a point cannot exceed the order
of the elliptic curve.
The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems is based on the diﬃculty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on the EC group. The Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is about determining the least positive integer k
which satisﬁes the equation Q = kP for two given points Q and P on the EC
group. A user A in an elliptic curve cryptosystems can choose a random integer
0 < k < p−1 and send Q to a user B with whom he wants to communicate secretly.
A’s public key is Q and his private key is k. Then an encryption algorithm can be
applied (e.g. ElGamal encryption [15]) so that B can encrypt the message he wishes
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to send to A with the public key Q and A will decrypt it using his private key k.
The Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman Algorithm algorithm [13] is based on the dif-
ﬁculty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. Its Elliptic Curve analog is as
follows. Let A and B be two entities that wish to share a secret key. Both A and
B generate a pair of public/private key (kA, QA) and (kB, QB) respectively. Then
A sends QA to B and B sends QB to A. A computes S = kAQB and B S = kBQA,
where S is now their shared secret key. The only weakness of this algorithm is
that there must be an authentication process between A and B so that there is a
guarantee that every entity is who he claims to be. In the group key protocols that
will be described in the next section, we assume that there is such an authentication
between every two members of the group.
3 The GDH.3 Group Key Establishment Protocol
GDH.3 protocol was presented in [28] together with GDH.1 and GDH.2 protocols. It
is particularly suitable for environments which require the minimum computational
eﬀort from each group member. The protocol evolves in four stages and here we will
present its elliptic curve analog. Suppose that every member in the group agreed
on the use of the same elliptic curve parameters. The number of participants is n
and we will denote by Mi the i-th participant.
(i) In the ﬁrst stage every group member Mi generates a random secret value ki.
The M1 participant selects a point P and sends to M2 the point Q1 = k1P .
Then M2 sends to M3 the point Q2 = k1k2P and so on until the protocol
reaches member Mn−1. Notice here that the protocol must pass only one time
from every participant.
(ii) Group member Mn−1 computes the point Qn−1 = k1k2 . . . kn−1P and sends it
to all Mi, with i ∈ [1, n].
(iii) In the third stage every group member Mi, i ∈ [1, n − 1] computes a point
Gi = k−1i Qn−1 and sends it to the last group member Mn.
(iv) Mn calculates the values knGi and send them to the corresponding members
Mi.
After these stages, every group member Mi can calculate the group key Qn =
k1k2 . . . knP by multiplying the value knGi with its secret number ki. Despite its
eﬃciency, the disadvantage of GDH.3 protocol is that it does not oﬀer symmetric
operation, because all the participants in the protocol do not perform the same
number of operations. If the number of the participants is large, then the compu-
tational eﬀort in member Mn can be devastating for its energy. For this reason,
we propose a new protocol which oﬀers symmetric operation and requires that all
devices perform the same number of operations.
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4 Our Group Key Establishment Protocol
The GDH.3 protocol [28] relies on communication primitives that provide global
ordering of the devices (stage 1), e.g. such as a (virtual) ring-based topology and
enable many-to-many message exchanges (stages 2,3). In ﬁxed infrastructure based
networks, such communication primitives can be provided by the ﬁxed part (i.e. base
stations), however, in wireless sensor networks the ﬁxed infrastructure is sparse (or
even non existing), making it diﬃcult (or even impossible) to implement such prim-
itives via external coordination. Certainly one can assume that the participating
devices are capable of transmitting at long ranges, allowing them to communicate
directly with each other. Still, in the light of the dense deployment of sensor de-
vices close to each other, a traditional single hop communication scheme consumes
a lot of power when compared to distributed short-range hop-by-hop propagation
([18]). In addition, multi-hop communication can eﬀectively overcome some of the
signal propagation eﬀects in long-distance wireless transmissions and may help to
smoothly adjust propagation around obstacles. Finally, the low energy transmis-
sion in hop-by-hop propagation may enhance security, protecting from undesired
discovery of the data propagation operation.
In the sequel we abstract the technological speciﬁcations of existing wireless
sensor systems [24] as a system consisting of n devices connected through bidirec-
tional channels allowing direct communication between pairs of neighbor processes
linked by a channel. We assume that devices have distinct identities and only local
information is available, i.e. they know their own identities together with those of
their neighbors but no global information is available, such as the total number
n or the structure of the network. To simplify the presentation of the protocol,
we here assume that channels are safe, that is, messages are delivered without loss
or alteration after a ﬁnite delay, but they do not need to follow a ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst out
rule. In Sec. 5 we implement (in nesC code running in TinyOS) safe communication
demonstrating that the underlaying technology can fulﬁll these assumptions.
We follow a distributed approach that does not require many-to-many message
exchanges as in the case of the second and third stages of the GDH.3 protocol and
does not rely on any global ordering of the devices. Our protocol is based on the
observation that in the ﬁrst stage of the GDH.3 protocol, group member Mn can
compute the shared group key Qn by acquiring the point Qn−1 from Mn−1 and
multiply it with its secret value kn. Moreover, the points Qi = k1k2 . . . kiP which
are generated by each group member Mi can be used as their public keys while their
private keys are the values ki. Using this observation, our protocol totally avoids
the third and fourth stages of GDH.3 protocol as follows:
(i) In the ﬁrst stage every group member Mi generates a random secret value ki.
The M1 participant selects a point P and sends to M2 the point Q1 = k1P
which is its public key and can be used by M2. Then M2 sends to M3 the
point Q2 = k1k2P (which is the public key of M2) and so on until the protocol
reaches member Mn. The point Qn is the shared secret key and is calculated
by Mn.
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(ii) Mn now encrypts Qn with Mn−1’s public key Qn−1 and sends it to Mn−1. Mn−1
can decrypt the message with his private key kn−1, acquire the secret value Qn,
encrypt it with the public key of Mn−2 and send the result to Mn−2. The same
process will be followed by Mn−2 and so on, until the protocol reaches member
M1.
In particular, we employ a distributed sequential traversal algorithm that visits
each participant of the group in order to build the shared secret key (starting from
M1 and reaching Mn). This is similar to the ﬁrst stage of GDH.3, without necessarily
requiring direct communication among all the group members and still guaranteeing
that each participant are visited only one time. When the traversal is ﬁnished and
all participants are visited, the protocol reaches member Mn that calculates the
point Qn, the shared secret key. Finally, in order for Mn to communicate the
shared secret key to all the participants of the group, it repeats the distributed
traversal but in reverse order. Mn now encrypts Qn with Mn−1’s public key Qn−1
and sends it to Mn−1. Mn−1 can decrypt the message with his private key kn−1,
acquire the secret value Qn, encrypt it with the public key of Mn−2 and send the
result to Mn−2. The same process will be followed by Mn−2 and so on, until the
protocol reaches member M1.
Assigning Groups. Our group key distribution protocol is applicable to hierarchi-
cal wireless sensor networks, in the sense that among the nodes there is a hierarchy
based on their capabilities. The hierarchical network is composed by a base station,
group leaders and simple nodes (group members). The base station represents the
authorities of this remote surveillance system (i.e. where the wireless sensors re-
port), has very large storage and data process capabilities and is usually a gateway
to another network (i.e. the internet). Typically, the sensors are deployed around
the area of the base station and form groups given the needs of the base station.
Group leaders are ordinary sensor nodes which can collect local traﬃc and send it
to the base station. Also, they are trusted components and sensors in their groups
get routing information from them. Data ﬂow in our network is group-wise within
a group of sensor nodes.
Initial Group formation. Based on the initial assignment of the sensors in a given
group M (deﬁned by the base station), every group member Mi generates a random
secret value ki while the group leader M1 selects a point P and calculates the point
Q1 = k1P which is its public key. Then, based on a distributed sequential traversal
algorithm that visits all partipants at least once, and particularly a distributed
depth-ﬁrst traversal algorithm, it sends Q1 to M2 (i.e. a neighboring group member)
via special SEARCH<M2, Q1> message. When M2 receives the message, it becomes
active for the ﬁrst time, it becomes visited and deﬁnes participant M1 as its father
(we say M2 joins the traversal). Moreover, when M2 is active, it calculates the point
Q2 = k1k2P (which is the public key of M2) and shifts the control to a non visited
neighbor M3, through a special SEARCH<M3, Q2> message.
When the protocol reaches member Mu with all its neighbors being visited, Mu
encrypts Qu with Mu−1’s public key Qu−1 and sends it to Mu−1 (its father) using
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a special PARENT<Mu−1, encrypt(Qu, Qu−1)> message 6 . Mu−1 can decrypt the
message with his private key ku−1, acquire the secret value Qu and either continue
the distributed sequential traversal by shifting the control to the next non visited
neighbor (if any), again through a special SEARCH<Mv, Qu> or if all its neighbors
have been visited, send a PARENT<Mu−2, encrypt(Qu, Qu−2)> message to its par-
ent. This process continues until the protocol reaches the last member of the group
Mn that calculates the point Qn, the shared secret key. In a similar way with Mu,
Mn encrypts Qn with Mn−1’s public key Qn−1 and sends it to Mn−1 (its father)
using a special PARENT<Mn−1, encrypt(Qn, Qn−1)> message.
In the case where Mu has more than one children (in the depth-ﬁrst virtual tree),
upon receiving the PARENT message from the last child (let this be Mv) that contains
the shared key, it ﬁrst sends the PARENT<Mu−1, encrypt(Qn, Qu−1)> message to
its father and then informs its children by sending the special message UPDATE<Mi,
encrypt(Qn, Qu)>. The child Mi that receives an UPDATE<Mi, encrypt(Qn, Qu)>
message, decrypts it to acquire the secret key and forwards it to its child by sending
an UPDATE<Mi+1, encrypt(Qn, Qi)> message. This ensures that the shared key
will traverse the depth-ﬁrst virtual tree all the way up to the group leader M1 but
also reach all the nodes that belong to a branch of the tree.
Implementation of this traversal technique requires for the active process to
know exactly which of its neighbors are visited. To do so, our distributed algorithm
apart from the SEARCH and PARENT message, uses a special VISITED message that
allows each visited process to inform its neighbors (by broadcasting the message)
that it has joined the traversal.
Our protocol essentially builds a depth-ﬁrst search spanning tree of a network,
given a distinguished node as its root (i.e. M1) and its correctness essentially fol-
lows from the correctness of the sequential DFS algorithm, because there is no
concurrency in the execution of this algorithm [4].
Handling JoinGroup Events. When a new member Mn+1 wants to join a group,
it must ﬁrst be authenticated by the base station and get an ID and then contact
the group leader (via the nearest group member Mu and through the virtual tree
structure) a JOIN<Mu,Mn+1> message. The group leader replies by sending the old
group key Qn (again via the tree structure). Then Mn+1 generates a random value
kn+1, computes the new group key Qn+1 = kn+1Qn and sends it back to the group
leader. Finally, the group leader sends an UPDATE message to all group members,
again by using the virtual tree. The need to contact the group leader is necessary
in cases of more than one nodes joining the group simultaneously, in which case,
the group leader delays the UPDATE message until all new nodes have joined.
Handling LeaveGroup Events. In the case that a member Mu leaves the group,
the group leader generates a random value kn and computes a new group key Qn =
knQn. Then, as in the case of the JoinGroup event, it informs all group members
about the new shared by sending an UPDATEmessage using the virtual tree. However,
since the removal of the old member will disrupt the tree structure, the children of
6 The function encrypt is deﬁned as encrypt(data, key)
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Mu must now contact the parent of Mu and update the tree structure. If this is
not possible, i.e. because the parent of Mu cannot directly communicate with the
children of Mu, the handling of the event fails, and M1 is signaled to restart the
depth-ﬁrst tree construction and generate a totally new shared key.
Handling MergeGroup Events. When a group M ′ wants to join group M ,
the procedure followed essentially expands the depth-ﬁrst search tree to include
the members of M ′. The group leader of M ′ contacts the leader of M (via the
nearest group member of M , Mu) by sending a MERGE<Mu,M ′1>. The group leader
M1 replies by sending the old group key Qn (again via the tree structure) to M ′1
that is now denoted as Mn+1. When the message reaches Mn+1, the distributed
sequential traversal algorithm continues as if the members of M ′ where unvisited
members of M . In this sense, Mn+1 computes a new random value kn+1, calculates
the point Qn+1 = k1k2 . . . kn+1P (which is now the new public key of Mn+1) and
shifts the control to the next non visited neighbor Mn+2 (an old member of M ′),
through a SEARCH<Mn+2, Qn+2> message. When all the old members of M ′ have
been visited, the new shared key is propagated to the merged group through the
use of the PARENT and UPDATE.
Handling PartitionGroup Events. Instead of trying to compute a new group
key for the two resulting groups, when a PartitionGroup event is signaled our pro-
tocol simply reconstructs the depth-ﬁrst search spanning tree and generates a new
shared key for each group.
Periodic Group Maintenance. We here note that in order to handle the above
events, the virtual tree can degenerate into a spanning tree that no longer fulﬁlls
the depth-ﬁrst search criteria. Therefore, in order to balance the tree and also in
order to guarantee key freshness the group leader periodically restarts the depth-ﬁrst
search and generates a new shared key.
Discussion. Our proposed group key protocol satisﬁes the ﬁrst two cryptographic
properties mentioned in Sec. 1 and in particular the JoinGroup event accomplishes
forward secrecy while backward secrecy is guaranteed by the LeaveGroup event. Re-
garding the computational group key secrecy this is satisﬁed since, if an adversary
silently overhears radio communication and captures data, he can not discover the
group key as it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any secret value ki from the
transmitted data (he has to solve an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem). Ad-
ditionally, since our protocol does not require that all group members communicate
directly with each other via long-range transmissions. the silent adversary will only
be able to listen to a limited number of messages given its actual physical location.
All group events are handled in O(n) time (as in the case of GDH.3, assuming
that a bounded number of retransmissions are required due to collisions) and re-
quire O(n) message exchanges (again similar to GDH.3, although it is expected that
2n less messages need to be transmitted in the network). However, in contrast to
GDH.3, our protocol evenly distributes energy consumption among the participants
as each device has similar roles in terms of required computations and communica-
tion exchanges (energy-wise, the two most demanding events). Balancing the energy
dissipation among the sensors in the network avoids the early energy depletion of
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Addition Multiplication Random Encryption Decryption
Running Time 2.250sec 36.114sec 0.22sec 74.481sec 38.365sec
Table 1
Running times of EccM-2.0 for operations using 163-bit multiprecision integers
certain sensors (i.e. in GDH.3 participant Mn−1) and thus increases the lifetime of
the system by preventing from early network disconnection [27]. In contrast to the
GDH.3 protocol, our protocol does not assign diﬀerent roles to the participating
devices nor requires some of them to transmit more messages than others. The
distributed sequential traversal ensures that the devices consume more or less equal
amounts of energy as they perform the same number of events and communication
exchanges leading to better energy balance.
5 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the suitability of our protocol in sensor networks we carried
out a set of experiments based on the MICA2 mote architecture [24]. Currently,
these devices represent the state of the art in wireless sensor networks technology
based on commercial oﬀ-the-shelf hardware components and oﬀer an 8-bit, 7.3 MHz
ATmega 128L processor, 4 KB of primary memory (RAM) and 128 KB of pro-
gram space (ROM) and 512 KB secondary memory (EEPROM) and a ChipCon
CC1000 radio capable of transmitting at 38.4 KBps powered by 2 AA batteries.
In software, we implemented our protocol using the nesC programming language
and work with the Elliptic Curve Cryptography module EccM [23], implemented
speciﬁcally for TinyOS, that also allows to represent and carry out basic operations
with multiprecision integers of 160-bit size. Given this particular selection of hard-
ware/software we evaluated the running times for generating random secret values
ki, multiplying the secret values with a point P and encrypting/decrypting them
based on a given set of public/private keys. The running times shown in Table 1
were measured by the MICA2 device using the SysTime, TinyOS component that
provides a 32-bit system time based on the available hardware clock. To get good
average results, we allowed the device to repeat each operation at least 100 times.
The experimental results indicate that elliptic curves implementation is feasible in
sensor devices, as time to perform an encryption and decryption averages out to
74.481sec and 38.365sec.
Given the above running times for performing the necessary cryptography op-
erations, we continue by conducting a comparative evaluation study on the per-
formance of GDH.3 and our protocol via simulation. The experimental evaluation
is conducted with Power-TOSSIM [25] that simulates the wireless network at the
bit level, using TinyOS component implementations almost identical to the MICA2
CC1000-based radio stack. In this set of experiments, the amount of time spent ex-
ecuting instructions is not captured by TOSSIM. We generated loss rates from vari-
ous diﬀerent physical topologies of wireless sensor networks using the LossyBuilder
tool provided by TOSSIM [21]. The transmission range of the devices was set to 50
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Fig. 2. Energy dissipation per sensor device for
each protocol, in a 7 by 7 grid with node spacing
set to 15
feet and the topologies considered are 5 by 5 (n = 25), 7 by 7 (n = 49) and 9 by 9
(n = 81) grids with spacing of {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30} feet (45′ by 45′).
Our protocol (see Sec. 4) relies on certain assumptions on the underlaying net-
work. In order to provide the necessary high-level primitives for the protocol to
be operational we implement two additional modules: (i) the Reckon module that
provides information on the identities of the neighboring nodes (that belong in the
same group with the node) based on short HELLO messages and (ii) the SafeSend
module that guarantees that messages are ﬁnally delivered to their destinations by
periodically retransmitting messages until the destination conﬁrms their safe recep-
tion. The GDH.3 (see Sec. 3) requires all devices to communicate directly with
Mn−1. To be able to provide this primitive, we implemented the Flood module
that simply ﬂoods the messages in the network until they are received by their ﬁnal
destination. We here note that the Bcast module provided by TinyOS implements
many-to-1 multi-hop routing and is thus unsuitable. Finally, since in GDH.3 the
devices need to know identities of all the group members (so that stage 1 can be
carried out) we also implemented the ReckonGlobal module that provides informa-
tion on the identities of all the nodes (that belong in the same group with the node)
based on a simple ﬂooding protocol of HELLO messages.
The experimental results shown in Fig. 1 indicate the diﬀerences of the two pro-
tocols. When the spacing of the devices is small and all devices can communicate
directly with each other, the GDH.3 protocol consumes less energy than our proto-
col. However, as the spacing of the nodes increases and the devices can no longer
communicate directly with each other, GDH.3 starts to spend more energy. On the
other hand, our protocol energy consumption is not aﬀected by the spacing of the
devices since each device needs to communicate with its neighbors. We here note
that similar results hold for other grid sizes (see Fig. 3, 4). Furthermore, based on
Fig. 3, 4 it is clear that both protocol spend more energy as the grid size (and hence
n) increases, especially when the spacing between the devices is big. Regarding the
energy balance achieved by the two protocols, Fig. 2 clearly depicts the exhessive
power spent by nodes Mn−1 and Mn that both have to transmit n − 2 and n − 1
messages during the second and fourth phases of the GDH.3 protocol.
Based on the above observations, it seems that GDH.3 is more suitable in cases
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when the network size is small and all devices are capable of communicating di-
rectly with each other. On the other hand, for sparse networks of large sizes it
seems that our protocol is more suitable. Furthermore, since our protocol requires
a large number of encryption/decryption operations to be carried out during the
distributed sequential traversal, the overall time to compute the shared secret key is
larger than the corresponding time required by GDH.3. On the other hand, our pro-
tocol distributes the energy dissipations to all participating nodes evently leading
to better energy balance.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
We have presented a new distributed group key establishment protocol suitable
for energy-constrained sensor networks of limited communication capabilities that
reduces the overall number of message exchanges by imposing a limited number
of additional computations that are however lightweight and easy to implement in
current sensor technology. We plan to further investigate the performance of our
protocol in case of more frequent JoinGroup/LeaveGroup events and also provide
mechanisms that update the underlying tree structure by periodically balancing the
tree instead of rebuilding it.
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